Abstract
We propose a new theory of how preferences and political institutions interact to determine US trade policy outcomes. First, we argue that congressional representatives cater to distinct subconstituencies on trade -this explains why Democrats and Republicans switched their positions on trade around the 1960s despite facing an increasingly similar composition of industry constituents. Second, we demonstrate that this finding has important implications for how divided government affects trade policy. We show that divided government will impede trade liberalization only when Congress is controlled by a political party drawing disproportionate support from import-competing interests. Our hypotheses find broad support in congressional voting data.
Since the establishment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) in 1934, external tariff policy in the United States has been largely determined through congressional delegation to the executive branch.
1 Scholars have applied insights from the principal-agent literature to this relationship, positing that delegation will be forthcoming in proportion to the preference convergence of the congressional median and the president (Lohmann and O'Halloran, 1994; Milner and Rosendorff, 1997) . The dichotomy between unified and divided government has received particular attention.
2 According to these accounts, delegation will be less likely under divided government, as members of Congress will not trust a president of the opposing party to conduct trade policy according to their interests. Since presidents are accountable to a broader constituency and, consequently, tend to be free-trade oriented, it follows that divided government has a tendency to raise tariffs. This paper presents an alternative to existing theories of the effect of divided government on trade delegation.
We will first argue that the sources of partisan trade policy preferences need to be assessed more carefully. Existing analyses of historical data show that the composition of export and import-competing constituents of Democrats and Republicans has increasingly converged (Hiscox, 1999 (Hiscox, , 2002b . It thus appears that industrybased cleavages are not a good predictor of partisan orientations on trade, which 1 Congressional delegation to the executive existed earlier, starting as early as 1799 and more notably in the McKinley Tariff of 1890. However, delegation prior to the RTAA was generally limited in scope. We will discuss this issue in detail in subsequent sections.
2 In this context, divided government occurs when one party is a majority in both the House and the Senate, and the president is of the other party. Unified government occurs when a party is a majority in both the House and the Senate, and the president is of the same party. For a discussion of the broader implications of divided government, among others, see Mayhew (1991) ; Cox and Kernell (1991) ; Fiorina (1992) ; Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) ; Epstein and O'Halloran (1996) ; Milner (1997) ; Krehbiel (1998) ; Trubowitz (1998) ; Shoch (2001) ; Burden and Kimball (2004) .
have dramatically shifted during the same time frame. We demonstrate that this observation is incorrect. Although Republicans and Democrats are elected from states with similar compositions of trade interests, they have very different subconstituencies. Based on empirical analysis of congressional voting data, we show that before the 1960s, Democratic legislators catered primarily to exporters, while Republicans catered primarily to import-competing interests. Since the 1960s, this pattern has largely reversed. Therefore, despite a convergence in the distribution of constituents between parties, each party remains strongly attached to one or the other industry group.
Second, using these findings, we develop a revised theory of the effect of divided government on U.S. trade policy. We argue that the effect of divided government is contingent on trade preferences of legislators in Congress. The RTAA and subsequent reciprocal trade legislation delegates authority to lower, but not to raise, tariffs. This feature acts as an ex ante constraint on the executive -pro-trade members of Congress can delegate authority without fear of adverse outcomes. Consequently, a pro-trade party supported by export interests will tend to find delegation attractive regardless of the president's partisan affiliation. In contrast, members of a protectionist party supported by import-competing interests will face a significant principal-agent problem when delegating to an other-party president. Thus, we predict that divided government will impact delegation only if a protectionist party controls Congress.
Our theory addresses some existing problems associated with the divided government literature. Much empirical evidence has called into question the claims of a direct relationship between divided government and trade outcomes. Most notably, major trade legislation has been enacted under conditions of both unified and divided government (Mayhew, 1991; Hiscox, 1999) . Karol (2000) asserts that divided government is "much ado about nothing" -data on congressional voting contradicts the notion that legislators consistently vote against delegation to an other-party president.
3 We will demonstrate that although the direct positive relationship between divided government and protectionism is tenuous, a conditional link appears to be supported by the data. Focusing on tariff data, another examination suggests that since World War II, congressional Democrats and Republican presidents have been protectionist, while congressional Republicans and Democratic presidents have supported free trade, producing the greatest level of preference convergence and therefore delegation under divided government (Sherman, 2002) . However, as we will demonstrate in subsequent sections, the tariff data is highly problematic as a means to evaluate institutional determinants of trade policy. We will also show that the congressional voting record is inconsistent with the theory that more delegation tends to occur under divided government.
To support our propositions, we analyze congressional voting on trade legislation in the post-RTAA period. We find that only members of the protectionist party have a systematic tendency to vote against delegation in the presence of an opposing party president. Controlling for other factors, in the post-RTAA period, a free-trade party senator was equally likely to vote for delegation to the president of the same or other party. A protectionist party senator was much more likely to vote against delegation to the president of the other party (the presence of an opposing party president increases the probability of voting against delegation by 32 percentage points, or 23-41 percentage points with 95% confidence).
Constituency Composition and Congressional Trade Preferences
During much of United States history, the Democratic party was pro-free trade, drawing support from export-oriented agricultural constituents. Republicans, on the other hand, drawing support from industrial interests in the Northeast, had been anti-free trade since the inception of their party in the mid-19th century. This gradually changed beginning around the 1940s for Republicans and the 1950s for Democrats (Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast, 1997; Karol, 2000) . By the late 1960s, it became increasingly clear that partisan preferences on the trade issue had reversed. Democrats voted against liberal trade bills with increasing frequency, while
Republicans became oriented towards free trade (Keech and Pak, 1995; Sherman, 2002) .
Class conflict based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Rogowski, 1989a,b) provides one possible explanation for this shift. In the 1960s, labor unions gradually shifted towards protectionism as imports surged in heavily unionized manufacturing sectors such as textiles, automobiles, steel, and electronics (Mucciaroni, 1995) . Labor unions, such as the AFL-CIO, have been a key Democratic constituency since the 1930s. Although Democrats had attempted to placate union concerns through trade adjustment assistance in the 1962 Trade Adjustment Act, trade adjustment claims were rarely accepted and the policy was perceived as a failure by the late1960s (Shoch, 2001) . Hence, for the purpose of coalition maintenance, Democratic legislators may have shifted to a more protectionist stance to accommodate labor interests (Karol, 2009 (Destler, 2005, 185-186 ).
An alternative explanation for the partisan reversal builds on the "specific factors" or Ricardo-Viner framework of the distributional effects of trade (Jones, 1971; Mussa, 1974) . Recent work has illuminated the role of export and import-competing interests on U.S. trade policy. In particular, scholars have focused on exporter interests as a primary source of the Republican conversion to free trade after the RTAA (Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast, 1997; Irwin and Kroszner, 1999) . There is controversy over which theoretical framework better captures empirical variation in trade policy cleavages. Scholars can point to considerable statistical evidence supporting the specific factors model of trade (Magee, 1980; Irwin, 1994) . Survey evidence generally finds stronger support for class-based preferences (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001 ). However, this may be due to imperfect measures of industry-based preferences for survey respondents (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006) . We will control for class cleavages in all subsequent analyses by including variables that proxy for capital, labor, and agricultural interests in the regression models.
Theoretically, the principal determinant of cleavage patterns is factor mobility.
Historically, factor mobility has varied across nations as a function of, among other things, regulation and the stage of industrialization (Hiscox, 2001 ). In the United
States, empirical evidence indicates that factor mobility has declined in recent years, elevating the importance of industry (export-import) over class (capital-labor-land) divisions (Hiscox, 2002a) . This suggests that partisan divisions on trade should be driven primarily by conflict between export and import-competing interests.
However, existing accounts based on the Ricardo-Viner framework also provide an unsatisfactory explanation for the partisan reversal on trade. Prior to the 1930s, Democrats came from states with a much larger share of exporters compared to Republicans, whereas import-competing interests tended to be slightly over-represented among Republican constituents. Such differences narrowed, however, and "by the 1930s, the distinction between the industry composition of the party constituencies had all but disappeared (Hiscox, 2002b, 139 In particular, we predict greater Democratic sensitivity to exporters and Republican sensitivity to import-competers early on. The opposite should be true in the more recent period. In addition, because the geographic concentration of economic activity in the United States has declined over time (Rogowski, 2002) , the effect should be greater as more states now contain a mix of export and import-competing interests. This leads to the following hypotheses:
• H0 ConstituencyConvergence : The null hypothesis predicts that legislators will respond similarly to the presence of export and import-competing constituents regardless of their partisan affiliation.
• H1 ConstituencyConvergence : Our alternative hypothesis predicts that legislators will respond asymmetrically to the presence of export and import-competing interests according to their party identification. In particular, Democrats (Republicans) should be more responsive to export (import-competing) interests prior to the partisan switch on trade, and Republicans (Democrats) should be more responsive to export (import-competing) interests thereafter.
In order to test our theory, we will utilize data from Hiscox (1999 Hiscox ( , 2002a to evaluate the effect of the size of a senator's export and import-competing conamong others, see Jackson and Kingdon (1992) , Shapiro et al. (1990) , Bailey and Brady (1998) , Bishin (2000 Bishin ( , 2009 , Clinton (2006) , Grimmer (2010) .
stituency on the probability of casting a vote for free trade. This is the same data Hiscox uses to observe that constituency composition has converged over time.
Operationalization: The Partisan Switch
In order to test our central hypotheses, it is necessary to consider the timing of the "partisan switch" on trade. Pinpointing an exact moment for the partisan reversal is impractical. Although there were some signs of protectionist sentiment among Democratic ranks as early as the 1950s (Bauer, de Sola Pool and Dexter, 1972; Sherman, 2002) , most scholars point to the late 1960s as the key turning point (Mucciaroni, 1995; Destler, 2005; Karol, 2009 (Mayhew, 1991, 137) .
In our empirical analyses of constituency convergence and divided government, 5 e.g., see Destler (2005) ,171. 6 "Congress, in a protective mood, prepares for round of its own on tariff reductions" New York Times, 1-8-1968 ; "Freer world-trade bill faces hard fight in Congress," Christian Science Monitor, 6-27-1968. we will conduct sensitivity tests in recognition of the inherent underlying ambiguity about the timing of the partisan switch. Our empirical results are highly robust as we do not need to make firm assumptions about the specific year of the switchthe switch can fall anywhere in between 1956 and 1973. 7 In other words, our results hold regardless of whether one assumes the partisan switch occurred during some arbitrary year between 1956 and 1973 or as a gradual process sometime between these years.
Empirical Test: Constituency Convergence
Our data covers congressional voting on a total of twenty-nine trade bills between 1824 to 2002 and contains state-level surrogates for various factor and industry groups, which are predicted to have a strong effect on the trade policy orientation of legislators (Hiscox, 2002a; Irwin and Kroszner, 1999; Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast, 1997 This is the segment of trade bills in the data set that occur after the Civil War when the current two party system stabilized but prior to the 1960s. "Post-1960s" contains trade bills from 1974 to 2002. 9 We utilize the following specification:
After obtaining the results from this probit specification for the periods of interest, we draw the relevant hypotheticals for party and export or import interactions by holding other variables to their mean values. 10 The farm, employment, and profit variables represent controls for class cleavages.
Our results are presented in Table 1 . The numbers in the table represent the hypothetical probability of a protectionist vote for senators in each era given a particular level of constituency size within his or her state. In this analysis, "small"
and "large" refer to hypothetical levels of export (import-competing) constituents one quintile below and one quintile above the mean respectively. As an illustration, holding other things equal, our model predicts that in the pre-1960s, a Democratic senator with a small export constituency would be expected to vote for trade protection about 11.4% of the time. A similar Democratic senator with a large export constituency would cast a protectionist vote only about 2.1% of the time. The "Difference" column subtracts the value in the "Large" column from the value in the "Small" column and represents the expected percentage point change in the probability for a protectionist vote given a two quintile increase in the export (or 9 We omit one bill in 1962 from this analysis, as there is some ambiguity as to when the partisan switch took place. Classifying this bill in either era does not substantively alter our results.
10 For more detail on this procedure, see King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000) . a "Small" and "large" refer to hypothetical levels of export (import-competing) constituents one quintile below and one quintile above the mean respectively.
b Values in parentheses represent 95% confidence levels. Star denotes a difference at least two standard errors removed from zero.
import-competing) constituency.
Several findings emerge from this analysis. First, we find that, consistent with H1 ConstituencyConvergence , the "partisan switch" between Republicans and Democrats has been accompanied by a reversal in sensitivity to export interests. The voting behavior of Republicans in the pre-1960s and Democrats in the post-1960s does not change significantly in response to varying levels of exporters within their state. In contrast, a two quintile increase in exporters decreases the probability of a protectionist vote for pre-60s Democrats by almost 10 percentage points, and post-60s
Republicans by about 15 percentage points. Our findings for Republicans are consistent with previous studies that analyzed the Republican conversion to free trade in reference to their increasing sensitivity to exporters after the RTAA (Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast, 1997; Irwin and Kroszner, 1999) .
11 However, during the same 11 Irwin and Kroszner (1999) analyzed a slightly earlier period in the 1940s and 1950s in regards time period, we find that Democrats have become increasingly insensitive to the size of their export constituents. This suggests that if the RTAA had a liberalizing effect, it was restricted to Republicans or inversely directed towards Democrats.
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Second, sensitivity to import-competers follows a comparable trend with some important differences. Democrats have become more sensitive to their importcompeting constituents over time. In the pre-60s, Democrats did not alter their voting in response to the size of import-competers, but in the post-60s, a two quintile increase in import-competers is associated with a 15 percentage point jump in the probability of casting a protectionist vote. In comparison, Republicans have been sensitive to their import-competing constituents in both time periods.
The Republican sensitivity to import-competers in the post-1960s is somewhat
puzzling. This appears to be due to the relative absence of export interests in some states. To elaborate, figures 1, 2, and 3 provide a more detailed look at post-1960s sensitivity to constituency groups. Figure 1 plots the predicted mean probability of a protectionist vote simulated from our model at various levels of export and import-competing constituency size for Republicans. The plotted surface provides information similar to the numbers in Table 1 , but gives us a greater sense of how the propensity to cast a protectionist vote varies along a continuum. Figure 2 does the same for Democrats. 13 The most striking feature of these plots is the divergence of voting propensities between Democrats and Republicans towards the region charto the Republican conversion -including those earlier years in the post-conversion period for Republicans does not alter the substantive results. 12 We also evaluated bills from 1875-1930 and 1934-1955 separately to see if Democratic sensitivity temporarily increased as a response to enactment of the RTAA. We found no evidence that Democrats became more sensitive to their export constituents after the RTAA came into place.
13 We chose to vary the value for import-competing constituents to the maximum empirical value but constrained the value for export constituents to the range between zero and 0.2. This was done to make our hypotheticals realistic. Plotting export constituency to the maximum value would leave the region farthest from the origin (high export and high import-competing) largely devoid of empirical data points. Extending the plots into the additional area merely reinforces our findings. Post-1960s Republicans: This plot contains the simulated probabilities that a Republican senator casts a protectionist vote under various levels of export and import-competing constituency size. We find that Republicans vote much less protectionist in the presence of exporters, even in the presence of import-competing interests. However, if the size of exporters is very low, Republicans appear quite responsive to their import-competing constituents.
acterized by high export and high import-competing constituents. A diagonal outward movement from the origin, indicating a simultaneous increase in both types of constituents, has a markedly different effect depending on the legislator's party affiliation. The propensity for Republicans to vote protectionist declines, while a similar movement is associated with a dramatic increase in the likelihood that a Democrat will cast a protectionist vote. This reinforces our conjecture that there continues to Figure 2: Post-1960s Democrats: This plot contains the simulated probabilities that a Democratic senator casts a protectionist vote under various levels of export and import-competing constituency size. In contrast to Republicans, Democrats appear to be consistently responsive to import-competing interests and unresponsive to exporters. As the size of import-competing constituents rise, the probability of a protectionist vote increases dramatically regardless of export constituency size.
be a considerable differentiation of constituency support for each party despite convergence at the level of geographic distribution. When legislators come from states containing both types of constituents, Republicans appear to derive support from exporters, and Democrats from import-competers. These observations shed some light on the findings presented in Table 1 . Republican legislators are sensitive to import-competing interests only when the size of exporters is so small as to afford no choice. As the size of export constituents increases, import-competers gradually cease to matter. The presence of export constituents effectively desensitizes Republicans to import-competers within their jurisdiction.
Our results in this section demonstrate that, despite the convergence in absolute levels of export and import-competing constituencies between parties (Hiscox, 1999) , these groups continue to asymmetrically impact the behavior of congressional legislators. In each respective era, the free-trade oriented party has been significantly more sensitive to export interests compared to the protectionist party. Sensitivity to import-competers follows a similar pattern, with the caveat that pro-trade party members in the current era cater to them in the absence of large export constituency.
The Structure of Delegation and Divided Government
The previous section demonstrated that partisan trade preferences continue to be influenced by industry-based cleavages despite the apparent post-1930s convergence in constituency composition -the pro-trade party tends to receive support from exporters, while the protectionist party tends to receive support from import-competing interests. This observation has significant implications for the effect of divided government on U.S. trade policy. Delegation of trade authority is asymmetric -under the RTAA and subsequent legislation, Congress has delegated authority to lower tariffs, but not to raise them. It follows that a party primarily supported by importcompeting interests will face a significant principal-agent problem when delegating authority to the executive, while a party supported by exporters should find delegation relatively unproblematic. In this section, we propose and empirically evaluate a new theory of divided government.
Theory: The Conditional Effect of Divided Government
Congressional delegation of trade authority to the executive existed as early as 1799 (O'Halloran, 1994, 77) , but was generally limited in scope. 14 For example, the McKinley Tariff of 1890 was enacted by protectionist Republicans and delegated authority for the president to enact retaliatory tariffs against a limited set of 14 The commonly cited reason for why Congress cannot achieve Pareto optimality on its own without delegation is the "universal logroll" argument. According to this, individual legislators in Congress cannot overcome their particularistic interests due to a type of collective action problem. We believe a more crucial reason is the foreign policy authority vested in the executive, which enables the negotiation of reciprocal tariff reductions with foreign governments. Unilateral congressional action to negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions, while theoretically possible, is plagued by severe commitment problems and political uncertainty (Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast, 1997, 322-324) .
goods when the president deemed the trade "reciprocally unequal or unreasonable (O'Halloran, 1994, 78) ." The Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 contained similar provisions as well as authority for the president to pursue limited reductions in duties.
The RTAA in 1934 represented a decisive shift, allowing the president to reduce tariffs reciprocally by executive proclamation alone, subject to periodic extension of authority (O'Halloran, 1994, 86) . It is important to note that the RTAA grew out of an attempt to institutionalize free trade. Among other things, the RTAA permitted US presidents to negotiate bilateral tariff reductions with foreign countries and lowered the threshold of congressional approval to a simple majority from the former two-thirds (Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast, 1997) . The RTAA did not, however, enhance the executive's ability to pursue protectionism. Since the 1970s, delegation has continued under "fast track authority" or "trade promotion authority," which similarly allows presidents to reach agreements to lower, but not raise, trade barriers.
15 Protectionist authority is embedded in other statutes such as the anti-dumping law, countervailing duty law, Section 201, and Section 301, which are frequently renewed under procedures separate from trade authority extension votes.
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For our analysis, we will posit the existence of a protectionist party and a freetrade party. We recognize that this assumption is a simplification. During part of the post-WWII period, there is some ambiguity as to which party should be considered protectionist -we will account for this ambiguity in our statistical analysis. Partisan 15 For presentational convenience, we will refer to "RTAA and subsequent delegation bills" in the subsequent text as simply "RTAA."
16 In some instances, a protectionist statute was created or extended in conjunction with a tradeauthority extension bill, as in 1974. However, these statutes are subject to different standards for reenactment and can be treated as fundamentally separate from RTAA delegation and fast track authority. For example, Section 301 was reenacted by presidential executive order in 1994 and again in 1999 without a congressional vote, the latter during a period when fast-track authority had lapsed due to insufficient congressional backing. cohesion is also a potential problem -evidence indicates that legislators increasingly vote out of step with their own party (Hiscox, 1999) . Nonetheless, studies have found a strong relationship between partisanship and trade orientation into the present era, even after controlling for constituency-level variables (Baldwin and Magee, 2000; Shoch, 2001) . Our empirical results also control for constituency composition and indicate that parties remain useful units of analysis despite declines in cohesion.
We assume that politicians have utility functions incorporating both contributions from interests groups and the welfare of consumers within their constituencies (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) . On average, free-trade party members will derive more support from exporters, whereas protectionist party members will generate more support from import-competing interests. Politicians from both parties, however, will have a concern for the general welfare of voters in their districts, who benefit from open trade through reduction in prices and greater variety of available products.
Under these assumptions, we predict that members of the pro-trade party will find it relatively unproblematic to delegate authority to the president. By definition, reciprocity under the RTAA implies that the president cannot lower domestic tariffs while foreign tariffs rise. In addition, the RTAA does not delegate authority to raise domestic tariffs. Therefore, delegation implies either maintenance of the status quo or a downward movement in both domestic and foreign tariffs. Hence, exporters have little to lose from delegation, and very likely something to gain. Legislators who receive support primarily from exporters will similarly find delegation attractive regardless of the party identification of the president -delegation is Pareto superior to autarky, both in terms of welfare to consumers and the interests of the exporter groups financing the legislators' political campaigns. The structure of delegation under the RTAA effectively serves as an ex ante constraint on the president by favoring a particular set of principals -free-trade legislators. Hence, we hypothesize that free-trade senators will find it relatively unproblematic to delegate to a president of either party.
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In contrast, we predict protectionist members of Congress will find it more difficult to delegate authority to an other-party president. Delegating trade authority is Pareto superior to autarky insofar as the legislators are concerned with the welfare of consumers. However, since they derive support from import-competing interests, protectionist legislators are acutely sensitive to the potential effects of a lower tariff on their supporters. Hence, a principal-agent problem, similar to that described by Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) , looms large for protectionists. Delegation will be acceptable only to a president with similar ex ante preferences or under significant ex post constraints. Ceteris paribus, presidents and legislators of the same party are more likely to be characterized by ex ante interest convergence due to a similar mix of constituents. In addition, partisan affiliation provides its own informal ex post sanctioning mechanisms and a longer shadow of the future associated with the likelihood of ongoing legislative cooperation. Legislators' interests can be taken into account by the same-party president via mechanisms such as offering concessions abroad that do not directly harm the legislators' most important constituents or by offering side payments to the legislators' supporters. Therefore, for protectionist legislators, delegation to a same-party president is less problematic than delegation to an opposing-party president. If delegation to an opposing-party president occurs at all, it is likely to be accompanied by heavy formal restrictions such as an ex post veto or peril point provisions.
Our theoretical propositions lead to the following hypotheses:
• H0 Delegation : The null hypothesis predicts that legislators, regardless of their orientation on trade, will tend to cast anti-delegation votes -against delegation or for provisions restricting executive autonomy under delegation -when facing an opposing-party president.
• H1 Delegation : Our alternative hypothesis predicts that only protectionist party legislators will tend to cast more anti-delegation votes when facing an opposingparty president. Pro-trade party legislators should tend to vote for delegation regardless of the partisan affiliation of the president.
Problems with Using Tariffs as the Dependent Variable
Several existing analyses of the effect of divided government on trade policy have focused on tariffs rather than voting outcomes (Lohmann and O'Halloran, 1994; Sherman, 2002 attempting to predict year-to-year changes in tariffs using simultaneous changes in institutional variables is highly problematic. Third, tariffs are measured as duties divided by imports, so a considerable degree of year-to-year variation is due to fluctuations in import composition unrelated to trade policy. Finally, statistical results based on analysis of tariffs are very sensitive to minor changes in specification.
In this section, we replicate the results from the seminal paper by Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) and demonstrate that their results are highly problematic. We will then move on to an analysis of voting, which is a more direct measure of legislator behavior. is estimated in first differences to account for nonstationarity.
The model is specified as follows:
The replication of the original results is presented in the first column of Table 2 .
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20 See Keech and Pak (1995) for a historical overview of U.S. tariff rates since the 1800s. 21 The precise values of the coefficients on some of the control variables could not be replicated. However, the coefficient on the quantity of interest (divided government) is roughly the same: 0.14(2.39) as reported by Lohmann and O'Halloran, and 0.17(2.02) as replicated (t-statistics in parentheses). 1949-1990 1949-2008 1935-1990 1949-1990 a Note: The coefficient on the substantive variable of interest -divided government -is not statistically significant when the data is extended forward or backward in time. It is also not robust to the inclusion of import price inflation in the original time period analyzed.
b We list coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. White's heteroscedastic-consistent variances and standard errors are reported. A star denotes coefficients statistically significant at the 95% level.
c We substitute CPI for as PPI data is unavailable for the earlier time period.
We collected additional data for the years 1991-2008 and reran the analysis on the combined data set. The results are presented in the second column of Table 2 .
Lohmann and O'Halloran's main result disappears. Before the incorporation of new data, a change from unified to divided government produced a 0.34 average percentage point increase in the tariff rate (0 to 0.65 percentage points with 95% confidence), whereas after inclusion of the new data, divided government has no effect on the dependent variable. Extending the data back into earlier years, e.g., , produces a similar result. The results are presented in the third column of Table 2 : divided government has no effect on tariffs.
22 Finally, across time periods, the key causal effect is not robust to the inclusion of import price inflation, which is an important determinant of ad valorem tariff rates (Irwin, 1998 ) -the final column of Table 2 demonstrates this for the time period used in the original analysis.
We found support for our theoretical predictions when substituting our variables of interest into these models -controlling for other factors, only the combination of a protectionist congress and divided government is associated with higher tariffs.
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However, our confidence in the validity of these results is low due to underlying problems with the original analysis. For example, it is virtually impossible under this setup to adequately control for multi-year phase ins that are distributed unevenly and oftentimes overlap with tariff reductions in other periods. Hence, for the remainder of this article, we turn to evidence from congressional voting, which is a more direct measure of legislator behavior and less susceptible to the problems outlined above.
22 In this analysis, we substitute consumer price inflation for PPI as PPI is not available for earlier years.
23 Results are available from authors upon request.
Empirical Test: The Conditional Effect of Divided Government
In this section, we will present an empirical test of our theory of conditional delegation. We hypothesize that the party affiliation of the president will be relevant only to protectionist members of Congress. The null hypothesis, consistent with Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) and Milner and Rosendorff (1997) , makes no distinction between the trade policy orientation of legislators and predicts that divided government will unconditionally result in less delegation and, by implication, more protectionist policy outcomes.
We will focus on congressional voting in order to evaluate our theory at the microlevel. The propositions related to divided government imply, as a first-order effect, that congressional voting on trade legislation will be impacted by the president's identity in the post-RTAA period. The voting data is characterized by a large n compared to the tariff data. It also allows for the observation of minority party voting. This is particularly salient for analyzing partisan behavior, since Republicans were in the minority for much of the post-RTAA period.
One general problem in analyzing voting data is the possibility that strategic voting will make preference revelation problematic. We believe this does not represent a major bias for the purposes of this analysis. Strategic voting is a problem for our results only if it causes protectionist-party voting to diverge systematically as a function of the partisan affiliation of the sitting president for reasons outside our theory. One obvious problem is that presidents can buy off swing legislators in order to secure approval for legislation, making the voting record an imperfect indicator for legislative preferences. However, the legislators being bought off are likely to be the cheapest to switch, i.e., those who have the least intense prefer-ences regarding the legislation at stake. If a protectionist legislator can be bought off by a protectionist president but not by a pro-trade president, it indicates that the protectionist legislator is more willing to delegate to the former rather than the latter, which is consistent with our theory. Thus, our theory is supported regardless of whether legislators voted for the president because of their true preferences or because they were the cheapest to bribe. Another potential problem is that once the outcome of a vote becomes obvious, legislators may use the vote as a costless signal to their constituents rather than reveal their true preferences. For example, legislators might sidestep the question of delegation to the president and simply play to the protectionist (pro-trade) leanings of their constituents. The presence of signalling in this data would actually reinforce our findings, as signalling tends to diminish rather than enhance the likelihood that we will uncover effects based on factors related to delegation.
Data
For this analysis, we selected Senate bills in the post-RTAA era that include provisions for delegating trade authority to the president. Because the factor and industry control variables are state-level and not district-level, our analysis is better suited for Senate voting.
25 As we discuss below, including these bills produces substantively similar results. 26 e.g., this is the case with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which extended fast track authority but also included highly protectionist provisions. These exclusions follow prior practice as established by Hiscox (2002a) . 
Model Specification
In order to assess the implications of the president's party identity on congressional voting on trade legislation, we use a probit model including constituency variables and the interaction of congressional and presidential parties. The model is specified as follows:
The interaction term takes on a value of 1 when a legislator votes in the presence of a president from the same party and -1 for the opposing party. The divided government literature predicts that in the post-RTAA period, legislators should have a tendency to vote against delegation when the president is of the other party (H0 Delegation ). In contrast, our theory posits that only protectionist legislators will behave this way (H1 Delegation ). In order to evaluate these claims, we run the model as specified above for various periods of substantive interest for votes taking place in the Senate.
Substantive Findings
For each period of interest, we ran 5000 simulations to obtain counterfactual expected values of interest from our probit results, holding the control variables to their mean values. We report the substantive results in Figure 4 and Figure 5 .
We first examine the entire post- RTAA era, 1934 RTAA era, -2002 . Figure 4 presents the results. In each graph, the solid curves represent the estimated probability of an anti-delegation vote under a president of the same party, while the dashed curves represent the same probability under an opposing party president. These curves are density estimates (smoothed versions of histograms) of the counterfactuals generated from our simulations. The width of the curves represent uncertainty estimates for the substantive results based on the results from the probit specifications. For example, the top graph of Figure 4 depicts the estimated probability of an antidelegation vote by Democratic legislators under different presidents in the 1934-2002 period. The solid line represents this probability when the president is also a Democrat, whereas the dashed line represents the probability when the president is a Republican. As the curves do not overlap, we can conclude that Democrats had a greater (and statistically significant) tendency to vote against delegation to a
Republican president compared to a Democratic president.
As a first cut, the results from : These panels contain density estimates of the probability that a senator casts an anti-delegation vote when the president is of the same party (solid curve) and of the opposing party (dashed curve). The panels show that after the RTAA was enacted in 1934, legislators appear to vote against delegation more frequently in the presence of an opposing-party president than in the presence of a same-party president. This is consistent with the conventional literature on divided government. vote under a president of the same party, while the dashed curves represent the same probability under an opposing party president. As these panels demonstrate, the president's party identification has a substantial impact only on the voting behavior of the protectionist party. Protectionist party members vote against delegation much more frequently in the presence of an other-party president. In contrast, density estimates for the pro-trade party legislators overlap so heavily that it is impossible to distinguish voting behavior on the basis of the president's party identification. As we predict, members of the pro-trade party in the post-RTAA era tend to support delegation to the executive regardless of the president's party.
To test our hypothesis H1
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Conclusion
This paper has extended the literature on domestic sources of U.S. trade policy in two important respects. First, we demonstrate that the "partisan switch" on trade policy that occurred around the 1960s has been associated with a reversal between Democrats and Republicans in their sensitivity to exporters. Since the 1930s, the constituency composition of the two parties has become virtually identical at the 27 To make sure our results are not driven by the particular selection of bills included in our data set, we also coded voting outcomes for eleven additional delegation bills in the post-RTAA era and appended them to the data set. These bills were dropped from the original analysis due to redundancy (e.g., a series of RTAA extension bills in the 1940s and 1950s that exhibited similar voting patterns) and ambiguity of protectionist/free trade leanings (e.g., votes on omnibus trade legislation in the 1980s). Since the state-level sectoral control variables are not available for these bills, we conducted our probit estimation using only institutional variables. We also followed a similar procedure for House votes. Our substantive findings remained unchanged for both chambers of Congress. state level. However, party legislators differ considerably in their responsiveness to export and import-competing interests. Before the 1960s, the Democrats were clearly the party of exporters and irresponsive to import-competing constituents. After the 1960s, only Republicans have been responsive to exporters, while Democrats have become dramatically more responsive to the presence of import-competing constituents.
Second, we have revised the conventional account of congressional trade authority delegation to the executive. Existing work asserts that divided government causes Congress to vote for less delegation, producing more protectionist policy outcomes.
By focusing on the structure of delegation and shifts in partisan trade preferences, we have posited an alternative theory according to which delegation is impeded only when Congress is controlled by a protectionist party. Hence, divided government matters, but only conditionally.
We find support for our theory in micro-level data on congressional voting on trade legislation. In the post-RTAA period, a free-trade party senator was equally likely to support delegation to presidents of either party. A protectionist party senator was much more likely to vote for delegation to an own-party president than to an opposing-party president. Across the post-RTAA period, the probability of an anti-delegation vote by protectionist senators increased by 23 to 41 percentage points (95% confidence) when facing a president of the opposing party.
The results of this article could be further extended through gathering additional data. District-level data would enable analysis of House voting and also give us a clearer picture of constituency distributions over time.
28 Evidence suggests that the 28 In the course of this analysis, we examined whether legislators in each party behaved differently based on the composition of their constituencies. For example, our theory implies that a pro-trade party legislator with a minimal export constituency and a large import-competing constituency should behave like a protectionist. Since such a legislator is not likely to reap significant benefits from tariff reductions abroad, delegation to an opposing party president will be problematic. Pre-House tends to be more protectionist than the Senate, although there is considerable debate as to whether this is to due to constituency size or some other factor (Rogowski, 1987; Karol, 2007) . Inclusion of House voting will therefore provide additional scope for variation to evaluate our hypotheses.
Our results present a mixed picture for the future of U.S. trade policy. In the current post-partisan switch era, we predict the most problematic trade policy outcomes under a Democratic Congress and Republican president. Other partisan combinations should be relatively less problematic. Nonetheless, one must be cognizant of underlying shifts in partisan relations with their export and import-competing subconstituencies. Our results point to an interesting asymmetry: in the current era, only Republicans are sensitive to their export constituencies, but members of both parties are sensitive to import-competers, albeit to different degrees. Just as both major parties briefly swung towards a relatively free-trade orientation on trade during the 1950s, ushering in an era of declining trade barriers and expanding global trade (Hiscox, 1999) , it is not inconceivable for both to turn protectionist simultaneously. Hence, the relationship between subconstituency preferences, legislative orientations on trade, and the institutional context of trade policy remains an intriguing and promising area for further research.
liminary analysis provides tentative support for our predictions. Holding other variables constant, we found that a hypothetical pro-trade party legislator with a mean level of export constituents does not vote differently under different party presidents. However, when the level of export constituents was reduced to zero, the pro-trade party legislator appeared to vote more protectionist under an opposing-party president compared to an own-party president, therefore behaving like a protectionist party legislator. Unfortunately, using Senate data, it is difficult to produce statistically meaningful results for this analysis as the counterfactuals of interest rely on sparse data. We therefore leave this question open for future researchers.
